

Chapter 5

"Towards a moral psychology"

A "shareable subjective experience" ...

What human beings do appear to have, by all accounts, and because those accounts are mutually accessible amongst us because of our common capacity for language, is a "shareable subjective experience". That subjective experience is, seemingly, hinged squarely on our consciousness which, by ordinary understanding, is intimately bound with our very self-awareness and our awareness of other human beings. Now there is something "circular" in this way of looking at things, because we are proposing a set of inter-related concepts without trying to find an external aetiological origin or, necessarily, a "scientific" explanation (although we certainly wouldn't turn one down if it happened upon us serendipitously). To be quite explicit about it; moreover, if there is any such "first cause" for human consciousness, we do not have to assume that it has a material or biochemical nature for no such proof exists in philosophy or science. What's wrong with saying that whilst the jury is out developments in understanding would be most welcome? To do so defers to another sensible notion - also obscure in origin - which cautions us against "contempt prior to investigation"⁵². Given the inconclusiveness of the arguments for both "monism" and "dualism" presented in recent pages, it is reasonable - perhaps even wise - to sidestep if not abandon the "mind-body problem" as it has been presented traditionally entirely. We do not have to accept the Cartesian notion of an independent metaphysical intellect, nor the radical behaviorist assumption of automaton, in order to have a useful, pragmatic notion or concept of "mind" for the purpose of a meaningful work-a-day modern psychology. The title of the previous chapter is a tweaked version of an expression coined by the British philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) who described (disparagingly) the dualist's assertion of a "mind" or "soul" separate from but governing its body "the dogma of the ghost in the machine"⁵³. Ryle recoiled at the prospect of a Cartesian "mind" having the capacity to control the body when "mind" and "body" respectively belong to two different "logical categories". Whilst we could say in Platonic or Cartesian terms that mind and body are made of different "substance", Ryle is saying more: that the difference between the two is more than that between chalk and cheese, even chalk and moon dust: they are different types of "things" entirely. Dualism is both a myth and a red herring. "Mind" is just a set of behavioural dispositions, is descriptive rather than explanatory, and is sufficient to account for "higher" faculties, including language.

⁵² The expression, "There is a principle which is a bar against all information, which cannot fail to keep a man in everlasting ignorance - that principle is contempt prior to investigation" has been over-attributed to Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) who coined the Darwinian phrase "survival of the fittest". The quote has not been traced reliably to Spencer's record; moreover, although the first misattribution probably occurred earlier, it was compounded in the First Edition (1939) of the core text (aka "The Big Book") from Alcoholics Anonymous. Strikingly similar instances have been attributed correctly to the British Christian apologist William Paley (1743-1805) in *A View Of The Evidences Of Christianity* (1794), and also in *Anglo-Israel Or, The British Nation: The Lost Tribes Of Israel* (1879) by the Reverend William Henry Poole (1820-1896).

⁵³ Gilbert Ryle, who was a student of the philosopher and linguist Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1889-1951), coined the expression "the ghost in the machine" in his book *The Concept Of Mind* published by the University of Chicago Press in 1949. A related book *The Ghost In The Machine* (1967, Hutchinson) by Arthur Koestler (1905-1983) constitutes a theory of human self-destruction and, like Ryle's work, is contemptuous of both the ultra-dualist Cartesian "mind", but also of Skinner's radical behaviorism.

... upon which we may all agree?

Is there any good reason to pursue the matter further? Well, perhaps there is one. It is likely that, even among behaviorists across the spectrum from, let us say, radical to soft - or "hawk" to "dove" - there will be a variety of views about what is meant by "mind", and how acceptable or repugnant that proposition may be philosophically. If there is a single thread or common denominator, it is probably that behaviorists - as a pack - are simply "anti-Cartesian", or just don't like "dualism" (or, as we have seen, the notion that there is a mental entity independent of any physical substructure). The radical behaviorist (aka "hawk") such as Burrhus Frederic Skinner may be a "scientific determinist" - a person who considers that all behaviour is accounted for by cause and effect relationships without needing to resort to either the existence or effect of subjective human will. Is "free will" a necessary and integral part of a "moral psychology"? If it is, we must find and incorporate it. If it is real, but not necessary and integral, we must say why we can discard it because the word "moral"⁵⁴ certainly conveys a connotation of personal "choice". Some folks are equally as wedded to the idea that everything we think and do is "decisional", as others are to the notion that everything that happens - including human behaviour itself - is "scientifically determined" according to the same kinds of laws as those that govern the behaviour of chemicals in a jar or the motion of the planets. Amongst the latter belong people who will concede quite spontaneously that not all of those (physical and) behavioural laws have yet been discovered and, amongst those in turn, some will never concede that such unrealised understandings might lie beyond the reach of science (perhaps in the metaphysical or "spiritual" realm). We don't want to return to Descartes' "seat of the soul" to re-open the point about whether an invisible "will" can govern the material (body) and, so, we will say something else: whether free will "really" exists or not, human beings have a subjectively experienced and communicable sense of both "self" and "other" which encompasses a whole or qualified willingness to concur that what we do has consequences, that those consequences can be pleasant and aversive to varying extents for both ourselves and others and - that in human society - inevitably we find ourselves accountable either in conscience or at law for what we do or don't do. We are going only a little further than the principles of conditioning that were outlined in Chapter 2, although suddenly we have introduced the notion of "conscience". Let's examine it briefly.

Traversing irreconcilable positions

Now, suppose it is convenient, and may even be appealing to the imagination, to take a hard-headed view of conscience, rather in the same vein as Ryle has done regarding the "mind-body problem". After all, there are (broadly speaking) two superficially irreconcilable polar positions regarding conscience: namely, that conscience is entirely metaphysical (say, the urging of the divine in personal consciousness) on the one hand and, on the other, the psychologically scientific (behaviorist) stance which is that conscience (assuming one is not so hawkish as to reject the proposition that human beings

⁵⁴ As made explicit in the Preface (and elsewhere), it is not possible to emphasise sufficiently that a "moral psychology" is not predicated on any authority external to the individual unless that person elects of their own volition to embrace one. Nobody is writing anybody else's moral agenda - but anybody is free to be guided as they responsibly choose. Some people like to consider themselves morally self-sufficient, and that is their prerogative. Others like to be guided by what they regard as human wisdom, whether from an inspirational leader, or from some collective consciousness or social conscience. Still others seek and find divine inspiration. A "moral psychology" is accessible by all such persons. For some, if not most people, the source of their inspiration (assuming they recognise one at all) can change over the course of a lifetime. The relevant emphases will continue to be made throughout subsequent pages.

have one at all⁵⁵) is the outcome of fear-conditioning⁵⁶ especially during childhood. Amongst those in the former camp are apologists (both ancient and modern) in the Church and well-known philosophers such as Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). The archetypal scientific psychologist in the matter of conscience is Hans Jürgen Eysenck whom we met in Chapter 3. Between these parade a range of morality theorists, some of whom have become famous in philosophical folklore: Karl Heinrich Marx (1818-1883), Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900) and Jean-Paul Charles Aymard Sartre (1905-1980) to name but a few. For present purposes, a brief résumé of the respective vantages is all that is required in order to establish whether it is feasible to proceed with an outline "conscience" that is sufficient for the "moral psychology" which traverses the apex of this constellation of preliminaries regarding sanity, insanity and the "human condition"⁵⁷.

A recognisable "conscience"

For Kant⁵⁸, humans are both rational and morally free, meaning that they can readily make choices about a universal and intrinsic sense of "right" and "wrong" determined by "natural law" (to which we referred in the previous chapter). According to Kant, we have the capacity - especially when confronted with, challenged or confused about a course of action - to evaluate alternatives against the "categorical imperative". The category here could be "all humanity", and the imperative is what the category tends to discharge (from conscience) as a class. In other words, it is like a person asking, "What would (indeed, *should*) most people do in this situation?" In Kant's framework for dealing with morality, there is clearly some choosing process obliged, say, to defer to some moral authority which is not identical to the choosing "module" itself. In their respective ways, Nietzsche, Sartre and Marx have all argued against "natural law", preferring a political or quasi-political view which emphasises in different ways the various interests of classes of individuals or individuals as a class. For Sartre, there is no objective morality, and no God. We are responsible for our own moral development and for becoming "authentic" in that undertaking; accordingly, to defer to an external moral system, particularly a religious one, is to act in "bad faith". In identifying himself thus with moral self-sufficiency, Sartre was aligning himself idealistically with Nietzsche who earlier had distinguished between "master" and "slave" morality. Whereas the former is fundamental, worthy and individualistic, the latter emerges from social prerogatives and is, thereby, arbitrary and subjugated. For Nietzsche, Christian values are examples of "slave morality". Although we have considered diverse, even irreconcilable views of the sources of morality, none of these contradicts the possibility that species-specific, subjectively-experienced, importunate intrapsychic tensions are recognisable by any "ordinary person" as "conscience".

⁵⁵ Even such a "hawk" may tolerate the provisional view of conscience assumed presently and the more detailed account of its formation, effect and lifetime-course in Part II.

⁵⁶ We have covered the enormous scope of conditioned "hope" and "fear" based on a few simple mechanisms in Chapter 2. It is better to avoid the term "negative conditioning" for aversive or punishing reinforcement, because "negative" can have other meanings in the same environments - such as the omission of a reinforcer during a learning trial.

⁵⁷ The expression "human condition" is widely recognised, and equally broadly invoked across a range of disciplines, to describe the experience of being human *per se* - as a lifecycle from cradle to grave - including intrapsychic experience. It fits the thrust of this volume which could be put another way as, "The pursuit of personal sanity".

⁵⁸ Immanuel Kant is regarded as a model philosopher of the Enlightenment, when "reason" was harnessed as the new keystone for human thinking and behaviour (as distinct from old traditions including religious authority). Usually associated with the mid-18th to early 19th century many of its roots lay firmly ensconced in the Scientific Revolution.



Conscience: "Weight Of The Heavens" or conditioned fear?
Salisbury Cathedral, Wiltshire

The passions (including resentment) can stifle creativity

Nietzsche's career - which was chequered with lurches and setbacks including relationship challenges, domestic upheavals and mental health difficulties - presents enthralling instances of how the psychology of a person interweaves with the biographical course of a life. Notwithstanding having been appointed a professor in philology (the study of linguistic and literary meanings) at the age of only 24 (ironically, just as he was veering away from literature towards science); some 14 years later, the University of Leipzig refused him a tenure on the basis of his offensive mimicking and mocking of the Bible (and, thereby, much of monotheistic religious tradition in one fell swoop) in a series of publications under the inclusive title *Also Sprach Zarathustra: A Book For All And None* (1883-1885). In his own record, Nietzsche was stridently resentful about this rejection, which is fascinating in at least two vital respects: first, the relationship between resentment and insanity is critical as we shall see later; second and ironically, Nietzsche regarded an individual's creativity to be hostage to the passions (in so far as it was necessary to sublimate the latter in order to release the former in some kind of trade-off between base instinct and intellect). The relationship between "repression-sensitisation" and health is another story in the history of sanity, as also we shall see by and by.

Strangleholds on money and power

The key idea behind Marxism is that of "class struggle"⁵⁹. For Karl Marx, the whole of human history has been one in which material wealth (particularly the means of producing goods and the markets in which they are traded) has been controlled by a privileged few (collectively described as the "bourgeoisie"). Organised religion is indicted by Marx as an accessory in the business of oppression of the common people (or "proletariat") - responsible for the "loss of man" by generating a "false consciousness" of reality in institutional ethics. Morality, according to such a radical view, is a tyrannical counter-revolutionary device perpetuated to maintain establishment strangleholds on money and political power. Perhaps ranking as the paramount conspiracy theory of all time, it was Marx who described religion in this way as a sedative, soothing "opium for the masses". Would Marx, nevertheless, recognise the intrapsychic tensions that can urge a person to favour one course of action rather than another, generate conflict in some circumstances - and which potentially shape important consequences with which a person has to live depending on the diverse courses adopted? An only cursory examination of his biography suggests that he might. Like Albert Einstein (1879-1955) and Friedrich Nietzsche (who foreswore his Prussian citizenship), Marx became (and remained) stateless. Having been expelled at one time from Paris, he failed against his expectations to secure British citizenship. He had already moved to London where he lived in poverty with his large family - which included a child by his housekeeper. Marx's ideas have more to do with (uprooting) social structures than individual behaviour - whereas we are concerned with developing a psychology that helps any person to acquire and maintain sanity in all conditions, including the world in its present parlous state, and any other socio-political ideology that may hypothetically transpire.

⁵⁹ *Nine Seahorses* is reminiscent of Marxist ideals in that its underlying concept and related principles (see Addendum) hinge squarely on equality and mature community; nevertheless, *Nine Seahorses* is separated from Marxism fundamentally - by at least emphasis and, substantially, in its ultimate objective - because *Nine Seahorses* sees the human struggle (including the history of human malaise) as one of self-centredness rather than "class struggle". *Nine Seahorses* anticipates personal liberation through the practice of spiritual principles rather than the redistribution of material wealth as a first ideal (whence "social justice" will proceed as an inescapable corollary).

Conditioned (secular) conscience

Then there are those "true" psychologists, eminent ones such as Hans Eysenck amongst them, who argue that conscience is a complex set of conditioned responses which, having been formed in that way, are amenable to reversal according to the same or similar principles. According to Jeffrey Alan Gray (1934-2004), a well-established psychologist colleague of Eysenck's at The Institute of Psychiatry:

*What, then, is the conscience? We have already come across Eysenck's answer to this question ... conscience is a set of conditioned fear reactions. That is, in early life we learn to associate (by classical conditioning) fear of impending punishment with stimuli associated with the commission of socially disapproved acts. When in adult life we feel the impulse to commit such acts, the occurrence of a conditioned fear reaction prevents us: conscience. If we do succeed in carrying them out, we may nevertheless feel afraid of the consequences: guilt. It is difficult at the present stage of development in psychology to evaluate this suggestion with any precision; but there may well be much truth in it.*⁶⁰

Inspired (religious) conscience

Finally on this topic, an example of an establishment Christian's (i.e., a Roman Catholic's) position on conscience is best appreciated also by direct quotation. Here, Thomas Crean O.P. - a Dominican friar who responded directly to the attack on religion that was presented in Richard Dawkins' book *The God Delusion* (2006, Bantam Press: London) - writes conclusively towards the close of his argument⁶¹:

The human mind or soul is spiritual, therefore, and cannot share in the body's dissolution. It remains in perpetuity, with its power to know and to love, or also to hate. And though this cannot be verified by reason, the Catholic holds that the body will rise again, vivified by the same power that once created the world, to share in the immortality of the soul.

The atheist is logically obliged to reject free will. This is especially clear if he is, like most Western atheists, a materialist. Since every event has a cause, our bodily actions also must have a cause. But if all is matter, then our bodily actions are caused by matter. Now matter does not act for any purpose of its own, but by necessity: water does not flow downhill because it has chosen to, but because it must. Therefore, if all is matter, our bodily actions happen by necessity, and free will is an illusion. But if free will is an illusion, we need pay no attention to those who argue for atheism, since they cannot be thinking and writing as men guided by truth, but only as driven along by matter.

The Catholic, supported by the spontaneous consent of all mankind, holds that man is free. His actions therefore derive from some power within him that is not material but immaterial or spiritual, namely, his will. But if there were no God, I could not possess any such spiritual power. For my will did not exist before I did; nor, since it is not material, is it composed of pre-existing parts. It follows that a will, as also an intellect, must be freshly created for each new man who comes into being. Only God can do such a thing. If then we believe in freedom, we must also believe in God.

⁶⁰ Gray, J.A. (1971) *The Psychology Of Fear And Stress*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge (1987, p.347)

⁶¹ Crean, T. (2007) *A Catholic Replies To Professor Dawkins*. Family Publications: Oxford (pp.159-160)

Yet though man is free, he is not a law unto himself. God who makes his will has the right to command him how to use it. We must follow the law of good and evil that He has impressed upon our heart, and be ready to welcome those whom He may send to teach us about His will. And since no wise lawgiver promulgates a law without intending that its provisions be enforced, we shall be judged by God on the use that we make of our free will.

Common ground and a definition of "conscience"

Where does this leave us now? For the purpose of a "moral psychology" we don't wish to assume one alternative amongst these various views because: in the first instance and according to our stated view of extremes, it is unlikely that from one standpoint alone we will find a whole, incontrovertible and inclusive "truth"; second, if it is at all possible, we would like to find and build upon common ground, or at least the nearest we can find to something resembling it and, third, we need to take only what is sufficient for a "moral psychology". Accordingly, we shall just say that conscience is: a quiet strain, having the capacity to become psychologically "noisy", which has the effect of pressure to settle upon one or more beliefs, attitudes, intentions or behaviours (including not doing certain things as well as doing them) and which is experienced subjectively as psychological conflict - usually mild, but potentially deadly⁶².

The abhorrence of "emptiness": a question

Before moving on to Part II ("You Can't Win A Bad Game") which is about psychotherapy (or professional psychological helping), it seems natural to pose one more question; admittedly rather a proposition, before drawing up a summary of what we have learned about personal sanity from our whistle-stop tour of modern psychology. The question is, "Does this tension that is conscience as we have just depicted it, along with any other psychological tensions that we may care to recognise⁶³, engender a kind of subjectively-experienced 'emptiness'⁶⁴ which, as fallible human beings, we are prone to fill with all kinds of distractions, some of which are harmful to ourselves and others?"

Downstream, at the heart of the matter

Ancillary questions at the heart of "moral psychology" flow from this primary puzzler: "What is the nature of this emptiness?"; "Does everyone experience it?"; "Under what circumstances are folks more or less likely to experience it?"; "Why do folks pursue certain rather than other distractions?"; "Do we have the capacity to observe it, evaluate it, effect or adopt alternative behavioural courses directed at filling or otherwise compensating for it?"; "Is there a moral quality to any such processes?"; "Can the 'nag' of conscience be disregarded, resisted, or modified by personal will or psychological therapy?"; "Can 'self' change 'self'?" and, if so, "Why are there psychotherapists?" ... In the first instance, what is this "emptiness"?

⁶² According to Matthew's Gospel in the New Testament, Judas Iscariot hanged himself after betraying Jesus. One can speculate easily about the role of conscience in the long list of suicides in human history without straying off-topic. Even where there are exceptional external pressures, there will always be a clash with the survival instinct. There are many suicides each day - each a tragedy - and each imbued with a cloud of indescribable psychic pain of which "conscience" comprises at least a part.

⁶³ probably recognisable as "cognitive dissonance". Widely acknowledged in psychology since 1957, cognitive dissonance was introduced by Leon Festinger (1919-1989) who described it as a cognitive discomfort accompanying two or more contradictory beliefs and which we are driven to mitigate by rationalising or changing the beliefs germane.

⁶⁴ The notion of "hole in the soul" is easily discovered in popular psychology, and is probably traceable to Carl Jung's *Modern Man In Search Of A Soul* (1933). An earlier, dreadful, identity is in *Dark Night Of The Soul* (Saint John of the Cross, 1542-1591).



"What Is This Emptiness?"

Existential despair, like depression, does not answer itself

One of the greatest collective disappointments suffered by those at the cerebral centre of the Enlightenment was the (seemingly unexpected) frustration experienced by its most ardent adherents (such as Immanuel Kant) in attempting to prove the existence of God⁶⁵ (or any other divine reality) based entirely on man's sweet "reason". As the Enlightenment was understood by (nearly) all accounts to have represented the intellectual vehicle by which man was to release himself from the shackles of historical parochialism, something now had to take the place of, or go somehow beyond, reason itself. This, approximately, is how existentialism emerged. Existentialism, as a school of philosophy, favours the scrutiny of subjective human experience within a particular milieu which may be understood as the dilemma that human beings may encounter when trying to understand why they exist at all - and how they might go about their existence in a personally meaningful way. In a terrible sense existentialism looks like, and may turn out to be nothing more than, a vocabulary for moaning about everything that we don't "know" for certain. The term itself may have been coined by Gabriel Honoré Marcel (1889-1973), a Catholic⁶⁶ playwright; however, the first momentum behind the movement is usually credited to Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813-1855), a Danish philosopher with broad interests (simultaneously, a theologian who promoted pursuit of religion as a response to existential despair).

All religions address existential questions

The struggle to find purposefulness, whether through religion or any other kind of personal philosophy or related endeavour, can be discerned in ancient as well as recent history. In Northern India (now the Republic of Nepal, home to the Himalayas and Mount Everest) the teachings of the Buddha (Siddhārtha Gautama)⁶⁷ were received by oral tradition for some four centuries after his death before being recorded in the Buddhist texts. The Buddha's life was spent in restless pursuit of "truth" (Dharma) or "enlightenment". He found it, as legend has it, under a pipal tree (Sacred Fig or Bodhi) by the River Nerejāna in the Indian state of Bihar. What today we might call "moderation" (somewhere between self-indulgence on the one hand, and self-denial or - more violently - self-mortification⁶⁸ on the other) is known in Buddhism as the "Middle Way" or "Noble Eightfold Path"⁶⁹. The Middle Way involves right conduct in the domains of wisdom, ethics and concentration in order to achieve "self-awakening", liberation ("Nirvana") and alleviation from suffering⁷⁰. Existential preoccupations - or the search for personal meaning with moral overtones - are central in all of the world's major religions: polytheistic Hinduism and monotheistic Judaism, Christianity and Islam; however, Buddhism is not usually considered a religion *per se*.

⁶⁵ Almost needless to say, atheism (the affirmation that there is no God) has not been established by reason either, and "open-minded" philosophers are usually amenable to conceding ground to any person who claims to have experienced the divine directly - because such subjective experiences lie outside the philosopher's familiar stomping grounds of sensory experience on the one hand, and reason, sweet reason on the other.

⁶⁶ actually a convert from atheism which ran in his family

⁶⁷ Estimates of the Buddha's dates vary between about 600 and 400 BC.

⁶⁸ perhaps more commonly associated with fervent Christians purging "desires of the flesh" - sometimes prosecuted to self-carnage using devices such as a cilice or crop

⁶⁹ Curling on to itself, the first element of the Noble Eightfold Path, "Right View" - which might also be regarded as a reality-checking endeavour - is an understanding of the "Four Noble Truths", of which the "Noble Eightfold Path" is itself the fourth.

⁷⁰ In Buddhism, "Dukkha", which translates as suffering, has its origins in ignorance - or an unclear mind - attachment to worldly things and cravings of the sensual kind.

Unsatiated existentialism

Notwithstanding the long history of such human longing, Nietzsche has claimed that the "death of God" is well advanced socioculturally. God has been a product of human imagination - albeit a most entrenched one - and the inexorable dissipation of belief in all forms of deity will eventually leave humans without excuse for knowing anything with "certainty". In existentialism's darkest form, "nihilism", there is no hope at all: the world is defined by its absurdity, and there is no response for it. Nihilism's condition in active mode looks rather like clinical depression: but surely, then, the existential moralist like Sartre - preoccupied with "authentic" existence - is only likely to "find himself" up a dead-end street literally (i.e., in an early coffin), because he works a philosophy that asks too many questions and delights in presenting no answers. Existentialism gives us a compelling framework for describing the ache of human "lostness", but its usefulness, quite sadly, ends there because, of its intrinsically pessimistic nature, it refuses steadfastly to yield its own antidote.

When we stop arguing belligerently with the blindingly obvious ...

If there are no answers in unsatiated existentialism, and we have not embraced without any reservations or doubts a religion of choice - or, even if we consider that we have, perhaps we have not always been open-minded enough to consider ancillary ways to render easier our days (for surely God has not prohibited us from enjoying creation) - then, could a "moral psychology" fit the "search-for-happiness" bill? If there is any pre-requisite at all for sanity, surely it is a very simple "spiritual" yielding (where "spiritual", again, simply means "unseen"). We all know what this penny-dropping experience is: it is when one stops arguing belligerently with the blindingly obvious, releasing oneself instantly into a "fourth dimension"⁷¹ of alignment with the universe into the bargain. We begin by desisting from looking the gift horse of life in the mouth. Thankfully even the most stupid or sick of us can start at that point. We all know about this freedom from angst because of (at least occasional and small) doses of personal, first hand experience. It is a question of recognising and appreciating the precious phenomenon, and then working with each other to produce larger measures of it. The behaviorists can't cage, quantify or interpret them in the laboratory. Such realisations are a private as well as a shared phenomenon. They happen in and belong to you. Nobody can take them away from you. In you and others they can change the world. If, from Plato until now, the central or consistent focus of psychology has been the intellect, it is time to move on quietly - for satisfaction and fulfilment are for *Everyman*⁷², or they are nothing at all (unless you are a bigot of the most ugly kind). Psychology is no longer the playground of the *cognoscenti*. Let's restate the focus of a proper and relevant psychology: it is the yielding or submission of each spiritually equal human person to how it actually is. Let's stop trying to be clever, and let's get real.

... suddenly we are in possession of an "unfair" advantage

We are now ready to consider the world of professional psychological helping armed with: an understanding of the context in which such professionals operate (which bestows upon us an "unfair" advantage); a pragmatic (but justified) swerve around the "mind-body problem" (but knowing fully why we have effected it); a working definition of "conscience", and a preliminary appreciation of how compensating for the "human condition" can land ourselves and others in hot water.

⁷¹ For the physicists out there, we're just talking about a nice harmless feeling ... OK

⁷² derived from an unattributed 15th century play - *The Summoning Of Everyman* - suggesting any unremarkable person with whom any other "ordinary person" may identify



"Psst! ... Had Your Shirt-tail Tugged Lately?"